Managing adverse selection: underinsurance versus underenrollment.
Adverse selection in insurance markets may lead some consumers to underinsure or too few consumers to purchase insurance relative to the socially optimal level. I study whether common government policy interventions can mitigate both underinsurance and underenrollment due to adverse selection. I est...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 52; no. 2; pp. 359 - 382 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=150823205&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 150823205 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2021 vid: 52 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 150823205 10.1111/1756-2171.12372 ppf: 359 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 549KB tig: atl: Managing adverse selection: underinsurance versus underenrollment. aug: au: Saltzman, Evan affil: Department of Economics, Emory University su: California Government policy Intervention (Federal government) Insurance Insurance exchanges Health insurance exchanges sug: subj: Government policy Intervention (Federal government) Insurance California Other Insurance Funds All Other Insurance Related Activities Third Party Administration of Insurance and Pension Funds Insurance exchanges Health insurance exchanges ab: Adverse selection in insurance markets may lead some consumers to underinsure or too few consumers to purchase insurance relative to the socially optimal level. I study whether common government policy interventions can mitigate both underinsurance and underenrollment due to adverse selection. I establish conditions under which there exists a tradeoff in addressing underinsurance and underenrollment. I then estimate a model of the California ACA insurance exchange using consumer‐level data to quantify the welfare impact of risk adjustment and the individual mandate. I find (1) risk adjustment reduces underinsurance, but reduces enrollment and (2) the mandate increases enrollment, but increases underinsurance. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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