Against logical generalism.
The orthodox view of logic takes for granted the central importance of logical principles. Logic, and thus logical reasoning, is to be understood as a system of rules or principles with universal application. Let us call this orthodox view logical generalism. In this paper we argue that logical gene...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; pp. 4813 - 4831 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Aug2021 Supplement 20
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The orthodox view of logic takes for granted the central importance of logical principles. Logic, and thus logical reasoning, is to be understood as a system of rules or principles with universal application. Let us call this orthodox view logical generalism. In this paper we argue that logical generalism, whether monist or pluralist, is wrong. We then outline an account of logical consequence in the absence of general logical principles, which we call logical particularism. |
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