Against logical generalism.

The orthodox view of logic takes for granted the central importance of logical principles. Logic, and thus logical reasoning, is to be understood as a system of rules or principles with universal application. Let us call this orthodox view logical generalism. In this paper we argue that logical gene...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 198; pp. 4813 - 4831
Autores principales: Wyatt, Nicole, Payette, Gillman
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug2021 Supplement 20
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Against logical generalism.
      aug:
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          Wyatt, Nicole
          Payette, Gillman
        affil:
          University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada
          University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
          University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Canada
      su:
        Logic
        Nihilism
        Pluralism
      sug:
        subj:
          Logic
          Nihilism
          Pluralism
      keyword:
        Logical nihilism
        Logical pluralism
        Particularism
        Philosophy of logic
      ab: The orthodox view of logic takes for granted the central importance of logical principles. Logic, and thus logical reasoning, is to be understood as a system of rules or principles with universal application. Let us call this orthodox view logical generalism. In this paper we argue that logical generalism, whether monist or pluralist, is wrong. We then outline an account of logical consequence in the absence of general logical principles, which we call logical particularism.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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