Lange on Minimal Model Explanations: A Defense of Batterman and Rice.
Marc Lange has recently raised three objections to the account of minimal model explanations offered by Robert Batterman and Collin Rice. In this article, I suggest that these objections are misguided. I suggest that the objections raised by Lange stem from a misunderstanding of the what it is that...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 88; no. 4; pp. 731 - 742 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Oct2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Marc Lange has recently raised three objections to the account of minimal model explanations offered by Robert Batterman and Collin Rice. In this article, I suggest that these objections are misguided. I suggest that the objections raised by Lange stem from a misunderstanding of the what it is that minimal model explanations seek to explain. This misunderstanding, I argue, consists in Lange's seeing minimal model explanations as relating special types of models to particular target systems rather than seeing minimal model explanations as looking to explain robust patterns of behavior that are exhibited by a variety of physically diverse systems. |
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