Lange on Minimal Model Explanations: A Defense of Batterman and Rice.
Marc Lange has recently raised three objections to the account of minimal model explanations offered by Robert Batterman and Collin Rice. In this article, I suggest that these objections are misguided. I suggest that the objections raised by Lange stem from a misunderstanding of the what it is that...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 88; no. 4; pp. 731 - 742 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Oct2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=152572406&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 152572406 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2021 vid: 88 iid: 4 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 152572406 10.1086/713890 ppf: 731 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 77KB tig: atl: Lange on Minimal Model Explanations: A Defense of Batterman and Rice. aug: au: McKenna, Travis su: Rice Explanation sug: subj: Rice Explanation ab: Marc Lange has recently raised three objections to the account of minimal model explanations offered by Robert Batterman and Collin Rice. In this article, I suggest that these objections are misguided. I suggest that the objections raised by Lange stem from a misunderstanding of the what it is that minimal model explanations seek to explain. This misunderstanding, I argue, consists in Lange's seeing minimal model explanations as relating special types of models to particular target systems rather than seeing minimal model explanations as looking to explain robust patterns of behavior that are exhibited by a variety of physically diverse systems. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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