THE SIMULATION ARGUMENT: REPLY TO WEATHERSON.
I reply to some recent comments by Brian Weatherson on my‘simulation argument’. I clarify some interpretational matters, and address issues relating to epistemological externalism, the difference from traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and a challenge based on grue’-like predicates.
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 55; no. 218; pp. 90 - 98 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jan2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I reply to some recent comments by Brian Weatherson on my‘simulation argument’. I clarify some interpretational matters, and address issues relating to epistemological externalism, the difference from traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and a challenge based on grue’-like predicates. |
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