THE SIMULATION ARGUMENT: REPLY TO WEATHERSON.

I reply to some recent comments by Brian Weatherson on my‘simulation argument’. I clarify some interpretational matters, and address issues relating to epistemological externalism, the difference from traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and a challenge based on grue’-like predicates.

Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 55; no. 218; pp. 90 - 98
Main Author: Bostrom, Nick
Format: Article
Published: Oxford University Press / USA Jan2005
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        Debate
        Computer simulation
        Discussion
        Simulation methods & models
        Reasoning
        Hypothesis
        Philosophy
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          Debate
          Computer simulation
          Discussion
          Simulation methods & models
          Reasoning
          Hypothesis
          Philosophy
      ab: I reply to some recent comments by Brian Weatherson on my‘simulation argument’. I clarify some interpretational matters, and address issues relating to epistemological externalism, the difference from traditional brain-in-a-vat arguments, and a challenge based on grue’-like predicates.
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