Are ABM explanations in the social sciences inevitably individualist?
Agent-based models (ABMs) are increasingly important in social science research. They have two obvious apparent virtues: they can model complex macrosociological phenomena without strong assumptions about agents and without analytic solutions for models, and they seem to instantiate the methodologic...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 200; no. 1; pp. 1 - 23 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Feb2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Agent-based models (ABMs) are increasingly important in social science research. They have two obvious apparent virtues: they can model complex macrosociological phenomena without strong assumptions about agents and without analytic solutions for models, and they seem to instantiate the methodological individualist program in a concrete way. We argue that the latter claim is false. After providing schematic accounts of ABM models and a first introduction to ways in which to characterize individualist explanations, we work through six conceptions of individualist explanations that are decreasingly "less individualist" and argue that ABM-based explanations in the social sciences are not inevitably individualist in any of these senses. ABMs allow for explanatory relations among social entities and properties in the model environment and they are silent on what basic agents are, allowing social entities and properties to play basic explanatory roles. |
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