On young Turks and yes men: optimal contracting for advice.
We study contracting for advice by an agent about how much a principal should invest in a project. Providing the agent with incentives to perform research endogenously generates incentives for her to misreport the results. For high‐cost (low‐cost) projects, she wishes to overstate (understate) the m...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 53; no. 1; pp. 63 - 95 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2022
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |