On young Turks and yes men: optimal contracting for advice.

We study contracting for advice by an agent about how much a principal should invest in a project. Providing the agent with incentives to perform research endogenously generates incentives for her to misreport the results. For high‐cost (low‐cost) projects, she wishes to overstate (understate) the m...

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Publicado en:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 53; no. 1; pp. 63 - 95
Autores principales: Häfner, Samuel, Taylor, Curtis R.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Mar2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: On young Turks and yes men: optimal contracting for advice.
      aug:
        au:
          Häfner, Samuel
          Taylor, Curtis R.
        affil:
          Web3 Foundation
          Duke University
      su:
        Contracts
        Rent
        Advice
        Wishes
      sug:
        subj:
          Contracts
          Rent
          Advice
          Wishes
      ab: We study contracting for advice by an agent about how much a principal should invest in a project. Providing the agent with incentives to perform research endogenously generates incentives for her to misreport the results. For high‐cost (low‐cost) projects, she wishes to overstate (understate) the magnitude—though not the direction—of her research findings. For high‐cost projects, the principal mitigates the concomitant agency rents by committing to ignore extreme (Young‐Turk) recommendations, whereas for low‐cost projects, he ignores mild (Yes‐Man) ones. These results are shown to be robust to several natural extensions of the model.
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      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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