How Rich is the Illusion of Consciousness?
Illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Most debates concerning illusionism focus on whether or not it is true—whether phenomenal consciousness really is an illusion. Here I want to tackle a different question: assuming illusionism is true, what ki...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 87; no. 2; pp. 499 - 516 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Apr2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Most debates concerning illusionism focus on whether or not it is true—whether phenomenal consciousness really is an illusion. Here I want to tackle a different question: assuming illusionism is true, what kind of illusion is the illusion of phenomenality? Is it a "rich" illusion—the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incorrect representation—or a "sparse" illusion—the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incomplete representation, which leads to drawing incorrect judgments? I present this distinction and I classify the most influential illusionist theories along this line of divide. I then offer an argument against the accounts of the illusion of phenomenality in terms of sparse illusion. |
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