How Rich is the Illusion of Consciousness?

Illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Most debates concerning illusionism focus on whether or not it is true—whether phenomenal consciousness really is an illusion. Here I want to tackle a different question: assuming illusionism is true, what ki...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 87; no. 2; pp. 499 - 516
Autor principal: Kammerer, François
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2022
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=155887839&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 155887839
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        01650106
        5KZ
      jtl: Erkenntnis
      issn: 01650106
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Apr2022
      vid: 87
      iid: 2
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        155887839
        10.1007/s10670-019-00204-4
      ppf: 499
      ppct: 17
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 673KB
      tig:
        atl: How Rich is the Illusion of Consciousness?
      aug:
        au: Kammerer, François
        affil: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, CEFISES, Université Catholique de Louvain, FNRS, 14, Place du Cardinal Mercier, 1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
      su: Argument
      sug:
        subj: Argument
      ab: Illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Most debates concerning illusionism focus on whether or not it is true—whether phenomenal consciousness really is an illusion. Here I want to tackle a different question: assuming illusionism is true, what kind of illusion is the illusion of phenomenality? Is it a "rich" illusion—the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incorrect representation—or a "sparse" illusion—the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incomplete representation, which leads to drawing incorrect judgments? I present this distinction and I classify the most influential illusionist theories along this line of divide. I then offer an argument against the accounts of the illusion of phenomenality in terms of sparse illusion.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Erkenntnis
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2022
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N