The Demand for Insurance and Rationale for a Mandate: Evidence from Workers' Compensation Insurance.
Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates...
| Publicado en: | American Economic Review Vol. 112; no. 5; pp. 1621 - 1669 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
American Economic Association
May2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=156581796&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 156581796 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00028282 AER jtl: American Economic Review issn: 00028282 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2022 vid: 112 iid: 5 pid: 22 pub: American Economic Association artinfo: ui: 156581796 10.1257/aer.20190261 ppf: 1621 ppct: 48 formats: tig: atl: The Demand for Insurance and Rationale for a Mandate: Evidence from Workers' Compensation Insurance. aug: au: Cabral, Marika Cui, Can Dworsky, Michael affil: University of Texas at Austin Department of Economics and NBER Independent Researcher RAND Corporation su: Workers' compensation Insurance Health insurance exchanges Market failure Work-related injuries Market power sug: subj: Workers' compensation Insurance Third Party Administration of Insurance and Pension Funds All Other Insurance Related Activities Other Insurance Funds Administration of Human Resource Programs (except Education, Public Health, and Veterans' Affairs Programs) Other direct insurance (except life, health and medical) carriers Health insurance exchanges Market failure Work-related injuries Market power ab: Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure—such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities—may not justify a mandate in this setting. (JEL G22, G52, J28, K13, K31) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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