Argumentation, cognition, and the epistemic benefits of cognitive diversity.
The social epistemology of science would benefit from paying more attention to the nature of argumentative exchanges. Argumentation is not only a cognitive activity but a collaborative social activity whose functioning needs to be understood from a psychological and communicative perspective. Thus f...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 200; no. 4; pp. 1 - 20 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=157940434&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 157940434 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2022 vid: 200 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 157940434 10.1007/s11229-022-03786-9 ppf: 1 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 272KB tig: atl: Argumentation, cognition, and the epistemic benefits of cognitive diversity. aug: au: Pesonen, Renne affil: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Tampere, Kalevantie 4, 33100, Tampere, Finland sug: keyword: Argumentative theory Distributed cognition Diversity Information elaboration Social epistemology ab: The social epistemology of science would benefit from paying more attention to the nature of argumentative exchanges. Argumentation is not only a cognitive activity but a collaborative social activity whose functioning needs to be understood from a psychological and communicative perspective. Thus far, social and organizational psychology has been used to discuss how social diversity affects group deliberation by changing the mindset of the participants. Argumentative exchanges have comparable effects, but they depend on cognitive diversity and emerge through critical interaction. An example of a cognitive psychological theory is discussed that explains how mutual reasoning affects how we think, make decisions, and solve problems, as well as how cognitive biases may facilitate an efficient division of cognitive labor. These observations are compared with the existing results in the social epistemology of science. Moreover, I explicate the conceptual differences between the distributed and social processing of information. While argumentative exchanges belong to the latter domain, most existing simulations model distributed processing, which may compromise their real-world relevance and proper conceptual interpretation. However, I aim not to criticize the existing simulation methods but to promote an approach from the cognitive psychology of reasoning that complements the current use of organizational psychology and computer simulations by investigating a different set of mechanisms relating to similar phenomena of interest in the social epistemology of science. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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