Naive Realism for Unconscious Perceptions.
Unconscious perceptions (i.e., person-level perceptions that lack phenomenal character) have recently become a focal point in the debate for and against naive realism. In this paper I defend the naive realist side. More specifically, I use an idea of Martin's to develop a new version of naive realis...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 87; no. 3; pp. 1175 - 1191 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2022
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Unconscious perceptions (i.e., person-level perceptions that lack phenomenal character) have recently become a focal point in the debate for and against naive realism. In this paper I defend the naive realist side. More specifically, I use an idea of Martin's to develop a new version of naive realism—neuro-computational naive realism. I argue that neuro-computational naive realism offers a uniform treatment of both conscious and unconscious perceptions. I also argue that it accommodates the possibility of phenomenally different conscious perceptions of the same items, and that it can answer a further challenge to naive realism raised by Berger and Nanay. |
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