Naive Realism for Unconscious Perceptions.

Unconscious perceptions (i.e., person-level perceptions that lack phenomenal character) have recently become a focal point in the debate for and against naive realism. In this paper I defend the naive realist side. More specifically, I use an idea of Martin's to develop a new version of naive realis...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 87; no. 3; pp. 1175 - 1191
Autor principal: Beck, Ori
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jun2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=158079767&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 158079767
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        01650106
        5KZ
      jtl: Erkenntnis
      issn: 01650106
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jun2022
      vid: 87
      iid: 3
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        158079767
        10.1007/s10670-020-00236-1
      ppf: 1175
      ppct: 16
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 546KB
      tig:
        atl: Naive Realism for Unconscious Perceptions.
      aug:
        au: Beck, Ori
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, PO Box 653, 8410501, Beer-Sheva, Israel
      su:
        Realism
        Subliminal perception
      sug:
        subj:
          Realism
          Subliminal perception
      ab: Unconscious perceptions (i.e., person-level perceptions that lack phenomenal character) have recently become a focal point in the debate for and against naive realism. In this paper I defend the naive realist side. More specifically, I use an idea of Martin's to develop a new version of naive realism—neuro-computational naive realism. I argue that neuro-computational naive realism offers a uniform treatment of both conscious and unconscious perceptions. I also argue that it accommodates the possibility of phenomenally different conscious perceptions of the same items, and that it can answer a further challenge to naive realism raised by Berger and Nanay.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Erkenntnis
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2022
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N