Remembering is not a kind of knowing.
This paper purports to disprove an orthodox view in contemporary epistemology that I call ‘the epistemic conception of memory’, which sees remembering as a kind of epistemic success, in particular, a kind of knowing. This conception is embodied in a cluster of platitudes in epistemology, including ‘...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 200; no. 4; pp. 1 - 17 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Aug2022
|
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=158346803&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 158346803 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2022 vid: 200 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 158346803 10.1007/s11229-022-03814-8 ppf: 1 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1MB tig: atl: Remembering is not a kind of knowing. aug: au: Lai, Changsheng affil: Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Room 305B, No. 800, Dongchuan Road, Minhang District, Shanghai, China sug: keyword: Anti-luck epistemology Causalism The epistemic conception of memory Virtue epistemology Virtue theory of memory ab: This paper purports to disprove an orthodox view in contemporary epistemology that I call ‘the epistemic conception of memory’, which sees remembering as a kind of epistemic success, in particular, a kind of knowing. This conception is embodied in a cluster of platitudes in epistemology, including ‘remembering entails knowing’, ‘remembering is a way of knowing’, and ‘remembering is sufficiently analogous to knowing’. I will argue that this epistemic conception of memory, as a whole, should be rejected insofar as we take into account some putative necessary conditions for knowledge. It will be illustrated that while many maintain that knowing must be (1) anti-luck and (2) an achievement, the two conditions do not apply to remembering. I will provide cases where the subject successfully remembers that p but lacks knowledge that p for failing to meet the two putative conditions for knowledge. Therefore, remembering is not a kind of knowing but a sui generis cognitive activity. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2022. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|