Ontology and Arbitrariness.

In many different ontological debates, anti-arbitrariness considerations push one towards two opposing extremes. For example, in debates about mereology, one may be pushed towards a maximal ontology (mereological universalism) or a minimal ontology (mereological nihilism), because any intermediate v...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Published in:Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 100; no. 3; pp. 485 - 496
Main Author: Builes, David
Format: Article
Published: Taylor & Francis Ltd Sep2022
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159267498&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 159267498
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00048402
        BHK
      jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
      issn: 00048402
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Sep2022
      vid: 100
      iid: 3
      pid: 377
      pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd
    artinfo:
      ui:
        159267498
        10.1080/00048402.2021.1931377
      ppf: 485
      ppct: 11
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 785KB
      tig:
        atl: Ontology and Arbitrariness.
      aug:
        au: Builes, David
        affil: New York University
      su:
        Ontology
        Debate
        Whole & parts (Philosophy)
        Universalism (Philosophy)
        Philosophy of mathematics
      sug:
        subj:
          Ontology
          Debate
          Whole & parts (Philosophy)
          Universalism (Philosophy)
          Philosophy of mathematics
      keyword:
        abstract objects
        arbitrariness
        indefinite extensibility
        modality
        ontology
      ab: In many different ontological debates, anti-arbitrariness considerations push one towards two opposing extremes. For example, in debates about mereology, one may be pushed towards a maximal ontology (mereological universalism) or a minimal ontology (mereological nihilism), because any intermediate view seems objectionably arbitrary. However, it is usually thought that anti-arbitrariness considerations on their own cannot decide between these maximalist or minimalist views. I will argue that this is a mistake. Anti-arbitrariness arguments may be used to motivate a certain popular thesis in the philosophy of mathematics that rules out the maximalist view in many different ontological debates.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
      holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2022
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N