Does Neuroplasticity Support the Hypothesis of Multiple Realizability?
It is commonly maintained that neuroplastic mechanisms in the brain provide empirical support for the hypothesis of multiple realizability. We show in various case studies that neuroplasticity stems from preexisting mechanisms and processes inherent in the neural (or biochemical) structure of the br...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 89; no. 1; pp. 107 - 128 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2022
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=159632383&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 159632383 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2022 vid: 89 iid: 1 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 159632383 10.1017/psa.2021.16 ppf: 107 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 268KB tig: atl: Does Neuroplasticity Support the Hypothesis of Multiple Realizability? aug: au: Maimon, Amber Hemmo, Meir affil: Philosophy Department, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel su: Neuroplasticity Brain anatomy Hypothesis Materialism sug: subj: Neuroplasticity Brain anatomy Hypothesis Materialism ab: It is commonly maintained that neuroplastic mechanisms in the brain provide empirical support for the hypothesis of multiple realizability. We show in various case studies that neuroplasticity stems from preexisting mechanisms and processes inherent in the neural (or biochemical) structure of the brain. We argue that not only does neuroplasticity fail to provide empirical evidence of multiple realization, its inability to do so strengthens the mind-body identity theory. Finally, we argue that a recently proposed identity theory called Flat Physicalism can be enlisted to explain the current state of the mind-body problem more adequately. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2022 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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