Against Slagle's Reading of Eliminative Materialism on Self‐Defeating.
Jim Slagle claims that eliminative materialism (EM) denies some of the mind's self‐evident properties, such as intentionality, qualia and the view that beliefs are real or veridical. I, herein, will argue that what EM denies is actually the folk psychological notion of belief, not belief as such. Th...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Investigations Vol. 46; no. 1; pp. 99 - 112 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |