Collective practical knowledge is a fragmented interrogative capacity.

What does it take for a group of people to know how to do something? An account of collective practical knowledge ought to be compatible with the linguistic evidence about the semantics for collective knowledge‐how ascriptions, be able to explain the practicality of collective knowledge, be able to...

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Published in:Philosophical Issues Vol. 32; no. 1; pp. 180 - 200
Main Author: Habgood‐Coote, Joshua
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Oct2022
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Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        affil: University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
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        Semantics
        Possibility
        Sharing
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          Semantics
          Possibility
          Sharing
      ab: What does it take for a group of people to know how to do something? An account of collective practical knowledge ought to be compatible with the linguistic evidence about the semantics for collective knowledge‐how ascriptions, be able to explain the practicality of collective knowledge, be able to explain both the connection between individual and collective know‐how and the possibility of a group knowing how to do something none of its members know, and be applicable to a suitably wide range of groups. In this paper I develop a view which can meet all of these desiderata, which combines a Fragmented account of collective knowledge (Habgood‐Coote, 2019a), with the view that practical knowledge is an Interrogative Capacity (Habgood‐Coote, 2019b).
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