Moral Equivalence in the Metaverse.

Are digital subjects in virtual reality morally equivalent to human subjects? We divide this problem into two questions bearing, respectively, on cognitive and emotional equivalence. Typically, cognitive equivalence does not hold due to the lack of substantialist indistinguishability, but emotional...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	NanoEthics Vol. 16; no. 3; pp. 257 - 271
Autores principales:	Grinbaum, Alexei, Adomaitis, Laurynas
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Springer Nature Dec2022
Materias:	Bible. Genesis Plutarch, ca. 46-120 Shared virtual environments Virtual reality Affective computing Ethics Artificial intelligence Chatbots Dead
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost