Why I'm not a Humean.
There is an inconsistency between the access we have to our conscious lives and the Humean thesis of causal generalism. This was first drawn attention to by John Hawthorne, whose argument withstands a number of objections. Nevertheless, it has weaknessess. The first premise must be weakened if Humea...
| Publicado en: | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 104; no. 1; pp. 55 - 78 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | There is an inconsistency between the access we have to our conscious lives and the Humean thesis of causal generalism. This was first drawn attention to by John Hawthorne, whose argument withstands a number of objections. Nevertheless, it has weaknessess. The first premise must be weakened if Humeans are to be compelled to accept it, and consequently, the second premise will have to be stronger to retain validity. I shore up the case against Humeanism by providing revised premises along with new defences of them. I show why this also provides a lesson for non‐Humeans about the epistemology of causal relations. |
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