Why I'm not a Humean.
There is an inconsistency between the access we have to our conscious lives and the Humean thesis of causal generalism. This was first drawn attention to by John Hawthorne, whose argument withstands a number of objections. Nevertheless, it has weaknessess. The first premise must be weakened if Humea...
| Published in: | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 104; no. 1; pp. 55 - 78 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2023
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=162243193&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 162243193 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02790750 PHZ jtl: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly issn: 02790750 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2023 vid: 104 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 162243193 10.1111/papq.12398 ppf: 55 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 186KB tig: atl: Why I'm not a Humean. aug: au: Friend, Toby affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol su: Theory of knowledge Objections (Evidence) Argument sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Objections (Evidence) Argument ab: There is an inconsistency between the access we have to our conscious lives and the Humean thesis of causal generalism. This was first drawn attention to by John Hawthorne, whose argument withstands a number of objections. Nevertheless, it has weaknessess. The first premise must be weakened if Humeans are to be compelled to accept it, and consequently, the second premise will have to be stronger to retain validity. I shore up the case against Humeanism by providing revised premises along with new defences of them. I show why this also provides a lesson for non‐Humeans about the epistemology of causal relations. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Pacific Philosophical Quarterly is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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