Human–algorithm hybrids as (quasi‐)organizations? On the accountability of digital collective actors.
Models of individual accountability for algorithms' actions fail when a human–algorithm association comes to be viewed as a collective actor. In some situations, human and algorithmic actions are so closely intertwined that there is no longer a linear connection between the emergent collectivity and...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Law & Society Vol. 50; no. 1; pp. 100 - 120 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=162671995&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 162671995 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0263323X 7Q3 jtl: Journal of Law & Society issn: 0263323X maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2023 vid: 50 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 162671995 10.1111/jols.12412 ppf: 100 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 262KB tig: atl: Human–algorithm hybrids as (quasi‐)organizations? On the accountability of digital collective actors. aug: au: BECKERS, ANNA TEUBNER, GUNTHER affil: Faculty of Law, Maastricht University Bouillonstraat 1–3, 6211LH, Maastricht, the Netherlands Faculty of Law, Goethe‐Universität Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main, Germany su: Social interaction sug: subj: Social interaction ab: Models of individual accountability for algorithms' actions fail when a human–algorithm association comes to be viewed as a collective actor. In some situations, human and algorithmic actions are so closely intertwined that there is no longer a linear connection between the emergent collectivity and the complex interactions of humans and algorithms. In such collective decision‐making sequences, individual accountability can no longer be attributed. Therefore, a new perspective on human–algorithm associations that captures their emergent properties and organizational qualities is needed to develop appropriate models of collective accountability. This article seeks to answer a number of questions. How can the encounter between humans and algorithms within such a socio‐technical configuration be adequately theorized? Can the configuration itself be understood as a hybrid collectivity? Can actions be attributed to the configuration as a personified collective actor? How will accountability be institutionalized for human–algorithm associations – in centralized or distributed collective forms? pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Journal of Law & Society is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Journal of Law & Society holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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