Human–algorithm hybrids as (quasi‐)organizations? On the accountability of digital collective actors.
Models of individual accountability for algorithms' actions fail when a human–algorithm association comes to be viewed as a collective actor. In some situations, human and algorithmic actions are so closely intertwined that there is no longer a linear connection between the emergent collectivity and...
| Published in: | Journal of Law & Society Vol. 50; no. 1; pp. 100 - 120 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2023
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | Models of individual accountability for algorithms' actions fail when a human–algorithm association comes to be viewed as a collective actor. In some situations, human and algorithmic actions are so closely intertwined that there is no longer a linear connection between the emergent collectivity and the complex interactions of humans and algorithms. In such collective decision‐making sequences, individual accountability can no longer be attributed. Therefore, a new perspective on human–algorithm associations that captures their emergent properties and organizational qualities is needed to develop appropriate models of collective accountability. This article seeks to answer a number of questions. How can the encounter between humans and algorithms within such a socio‐technical configuration be adequately theorized? Can the configuration itself be understood as a hybrid collectivity? Can actions be attributed to the configuration as a personified collective actor? How will accountability be institutionalized for human–algorithm associations – in centralized or distributed collective forms? |
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