On the optimality of information sharing between integrated and vertically separated competitors.
A manufacturer relies on an exclusive subcontractor for production and competes horizontally against an integrated rival that produces in‐house. The exclusive agent is privately informed about the marginal cost of production. When marginal costs are correlated across companies, information sharing b...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 89; no. 4; pp. 1168 - 1196 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2023
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=162942918&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 162942918 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2023 vid: 89 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 162942918 10.1002/soej.12623 ppf: 1168 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 2.8MB tig: atl: On the optimality of information sharing between integrated and vertically separated competitors. aug: au: Battaggion, Maria Rosa Cerasi, Vittoria Karakoç, Gülen affil: Department of Economics, University of Bergamo, Bergamo, Italy Corte dei Conti, Rome, Italy CefES, University of Milano Bicocca, Milan, Italy Department of Economics, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy su: Information sharing Consumers Direct costing Agency costs Industrial costs Vertical integration sug: subj: Information sharing Consumers Direct costing Agency costs Industrial costs Vertical integration keyword: cost correlation information sharing vertical contracting cost correlation information sharing vertical contracting ab: A manufacturer relies on an exclusive subcontractor for production and competes horizontally against an integrated rival that produces in‐house. The exclusive agent is privately informed about the marginal cost of production. When marginal costs are correlated across companies, information sharing benefits both companies due to reduced uncertainty, but it affects the contracting terms within the vertical hierarchy and creates horizontal externalities between companies. We show that the manufacturer who suffers from agency cost benefits more from sharing information than his rival performing in‐house production only when costs are highly correlated, and in this case, information sharing may actually benefit consumers. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|