On the optimality of information sharing between integrated and vertically separated competitors.

A manufacturer relies on an exclusive subcontractor for production and competes horizontally against an integrated rival that produces in‐house. The exclusive agent is privately informed about the marginal cost of production. When marginal costs are correlated across companies, information sharing b...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Southern Economic Journal Vol. 89; no. 4; pp. 1168 - 1196
Autores principales:	Battaggion, Maria Rosa, Cerasi, Vittoria, Karakoç, Gülen
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Apr2023
Materias:	Information sharing Consumers Direct costing Agency costs Industrial costs Vertical integration
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost