Hedged testimony.
Speakers offer testimony. They also hedge. This essay offers an account of how hedging makes a difference to testimony. Two components of testimony are considered: how testimony warrants a hearer's attitude, and how testimony changes a speaker's responsibilities. Starting with a norm-based approach...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 57; no. 2; pp. 341 - 370 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Speakers offer testimony. They also hedge. This essay offers an account of how hedging makes a difference to testimony. Two components of testimony are considered: how testimony warrants a hearer's attitude, and how testimony changes a speaker's responsibilities. Starting with a norm-based approach to testimony where hearer's beliefs are prima faciewarranted because of social norms and speakers acquire responsibility from these same norms, I argue that hedging alters both components simultaneously. It changes which attitudes a hearer is prima facie warranted in forming in response to testimony, and reduces how much responsibility a speaker undertakes in testifying. A consequence of this account is that speakers who hedge merely for strategic purposes deprive their hearers of warrant for stronger doxastic attitudes. |
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