Neural Machinery and Realization.
The view that the relationship between minds and brains can be thought of on the model of software and hardware is pervasive. The most common versions of the view, known as functionalism in philosophy of mind, hold that minds are realized by brains. The question arises, What is the realization relat...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 71; no. 5; pp. 997 - 1007 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2004
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The view that the relationship between minds and brains can be thought of on the model of software and hardware is pervasive. The most common versions of the view, known as functionalism in philosophy of mind, hold that minds are realized by brains. The question arises, What is the realization relation? I approach the question of realization through a case study: David Marl s (1982) computational account of early visual processing. Marr's work is instructive because it is the textbook case of the hierarchy of mechanisms that has seemed to bear out the arguments of functionalist philosophers and cognitive scientists. I argue that realization as employed by Marr has some but not all of the characteristics that it is usually taken to have. |
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