Neural Machinery and Realization.
The view that the relationship between minds and brains can be thought of on the model of software and hardware is pervasive. The most common versions of the view, known as functionalism in philosophy of mind, hold that minds are realized by brains. The question arises, What is the realization relat...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 71; no. 5; pp. 997 - 1007 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2004
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=16630059&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 16630059 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2004 vid: 71 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 16630059 10.1086/425948 ppf: 997 ppct: 10 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 96KB tig: atl: Neural Machinery and Realization. aug: au: Polger, Thomas W. affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH, 45221-0374. su: Brain Philosophy of mind Cognitive science Metaphysics Mind & body Phenomenology sug: subj: Brain Philosophy of mind Cognitive science Metaphysics Mind & body Phenomenology ab: The view that the relationship between minds and brains can be thought of on the model of software and hardware is pervasive. The most common versions of the view, known as functionalism in philosophy of mind, hold that minds are realized by brains. The question arises, What is the realization relation? I approach the question of realization through a case study: David Marl s (1982) computational account of early visual processing. Marr's work is instructive because it is the textbook case of the hierarchy of mechanisms that has seemed to bear out the arguments of functionalist philosophers and cognitive scientists. I argue that realization as employed by Marr has some but not all of the characteristics that it is usually taken to have. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2004 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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