The Cardinality Objection to David Lewis's Modal Realism.

According to David Lewis's extreme modal realism, every way that a world could be is a way that some concretely existing physical world really is. But if the worlds are physical entities, then there should be a set of all worlds, whereas I show that in fact the collection of all possible worlds is n...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 104; no. 2; pp. 169 - 179
Autor principal: Pruss, Alexander R.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature May2001
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Realism
        Lewis, David
        Universals (Philosophy)
        Philosophy
        Theory of knowledge
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          Realism
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