The Cardinality Objection to David Lewis's Modal Realism.
According to David Lewis's extreme modal realism, every way that a world could be is a way that some concretely existing physical world really is. But if the worlds are physical entities, then there should be a set of all worlds, whereas I show that in fact the collection of all possible worlds is n...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 104; no. 2; pp. 169 - 179 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2001
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | According to David Lewis's extreme modal realism, every way that a world could be is a way that some concretely existing physical world really is. But if the worlds are physical entities, then there should be a set of all worlds, whereas I show that in fact the collection of all possible worlds is not a set. The latter conclusion remains true even outside of the Lewisian framework. |
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