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The Cardinality Objection to David Lewis's Modal Realism.

According to David Lewis's extreme modal realism, every way that a world could be is a way that some concretely existing physical world really is. But if the worlds are physical entities, then there should be a set of all worlds, whereas I show that in fact the collection of all possible worlds is n...

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Published in:Philosophical Studies Vol. 104; no. 2; pp. 169 - 179
Main Author: Pruss, Alexander R.
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature May2001
Subjects:
Realism
Lewis, David
Universals (Philosophy)
Philosophy
Theory of knowledge
Conceptualism
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
Summary:According to David Lewis's extreme modal realism, every way that a world could be is a way that some concretely existing physical world really is. But if the worlds are physical entities, then there should be a set of all worlds, whereas I show that in fact the collection of all possible worlds is not a set. The latter conclusion remains true even outside of the Lewisian framework.