Functionalism, Reductionism, and Levels of Reality.
I consider a problem for functional reductionism based on the following tension. Say that b is functionally reduced to a. On one hand, a and b turn out to be identical, and identity is a symmetric relation. On the other hand, functional reductionism implies that a and b are asymmetrically related: i...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 90; no. 4; pp. 922 - 937 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Oct2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I consider a problem for functional reductionism based on the following tension. Say that b is functionally reduced to a. On one hand, a and b turn out to be identical, and identity is a symmetric relation. On the other hand, functional reductionism implies that a and b are asymmetrically related: if b is functionally reduced to a , then a is not functionally reduced to b. Thus we ask, how can a and b be asymmetrically related if they are the same thing? I propose a solution to this tension by distinguishing between ontological levels and levels of description. |
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