Functionalism, Reductionism, and Levels of Reality.
I consider a problem for functional reductionism based on the following tension. Say that b is functionally reduced to a. On one hand, a and b turn out to be identical, and identity is a symmetric relation. On the other hand, functional reductionism implies that a and b are asymmetrically related: i...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 90; no. 4; pp. 922 - 937 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
Oct2023
|
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=173151297&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 173151297 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2023 vid: 90 iid: 4 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 173151297 10.1017/psa.2023.4 ppf: 922 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 200KB tig: atl: Functionalism, Reductionism, and Levels of Reality. aug: au: Lorenzetti, Lorenzo affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK su: Reductionism sug: subj: Reductionism ab: I consider a problem for functional reductionism based on the following tension. Say that b is functionally reduced to a. On one hand, a and b turn out to be identical, and identity is a symmetric relation. On the other hand, functional reductionism implies that a and b are asymmetrically related: if b is functionally reduced to a , then a is not functionally reduced to b. Thus we ask, how can a and b be asymmetrically related if they are the same thing? I propose a solution to this tension by distinguishing between ontological levels and levels of description. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|