Algorithmic Mechanism Design With Investment.
We study the investment incentives created by truthful mechanisms that allocate resources using approximation algorithms. Some approximation algorithms guarantee nearly 100% of the optimal welfare in the allocation problem but guarantee nothing when accounting for investment incentives. An algorithm...
| Published in: | Econometrica Vol. 91; no. 6; pp. 1969 - 2004 |
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Nov2023
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=174064829&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 174064829 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00129682 ECN jtl: Econometrica issn: 00129682 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Nov2023 vid: 91 iid: 6 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 174064829 10.3982/ECTA19559 ppf: 1969 ppct: 35 formats: tig: atl: Algorithmic Mechanism Design With Investment. aug: au: Akbarpour, Mohammad Kominers, Scott Duke Li, Kevin Michael Li, Shengwu Milgrom, Paul affil: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Entrepreneurial Management Unit, Harvard Business School Department of Economics, Harvard University a16z crypto Department of Economics, Stanford University Auctionomics su: Externalities Approximation algorithms Knapsack problems Combinatorial optimization sug: subj: Externalities Approximation algorithms Knapsack problems Combinatorial optimization keyword: algorithms approximation auctions investment Knapsack problem algorithms approximation auctions investment Knapsack problem ab: We study the investment incentives created by truthful mechanisms that allocate resources using approximation algorithms. Some approximation algorithms guarantee nearly 100% of the optimal welfare in the allocation problem but guarantee nothing when accounting for investment incentives. An algorithm's allocative and investment guarantees coincide if and only if its confirming negative externalities are sufficiently small. We introduce fast approximation algorithms for the knapsack problem that have no confirming negative externalities and guarantees close to 100% for both allocation and investment. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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