Algorithmic Mechanism Design With Investment.

We study the investment incentives created by truthful mechanisms that allocate resources using approximation algorithms. Some approximation algorithms guarantee nearly 100% of the optimal welfare in the allocation problem but guarantee nothing when accounting for investment incentives. An algorithm...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Econometrica Vol. 91; no. 6; pp. 1969 - 2004
Autores principales:	Akbarpour, Mohammad, Kominers, Scott Duke, Li, Kevin Michael, Li, Shengwu, Milgrom, Paul
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Nov2023
Materias:	Externalities Approximation algorithms Knapsack problems Combinatorial optimization
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost