Cooperative Epistemic Trustworthiness.
Extant accounts of trust in science focus on reconciling scientific and public value judgments, but neglect the challenge of learning audience values. I argue that for scientific experts to be epistemically trustworthy, they should adopt a cooperative approach to learning about the values of their a...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 90; no. 5; pp. 1100 - 1110 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Extant accounts of trust in science focus on reconciling scientific and public value judgments, but neglect the challenge of learning audience values. I argue that for scientific experts to be epistemically trustworthy, they should adopt a cooperative approach to learning about the values of their audience. A cooperative approach, in which expert and nonexpert inquirers iteratively refine value judgments, better achieves important second-order epistemic dimensions of trustworthiness. I suggest that strong objectivity in the feminist standpoint theoretic sense is sometimes a prerequisite for trustworthiness. |
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