Cooperative Epistemic Trustworthiness.

Extant accounts of trust in science focus on reconciling scientific and public value judgments, but neglect the challenge of learning audience values. I argue that for scientific experts to be epistemically trustworthy, they should adopt a cooperative approach to learning about the values of their a...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 90; no. 5; pp. 1100 - 1110
Autor principal: DiMarco, Marina
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Dec2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: DiMarco, Marina
        affil: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
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        Trust
        Public value
        Group work in education
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          Trust
          Public value
          Group work in education
      ab: Extant accounts of trust in science focus on reconciling scientific and public value judgments, but neglect the challenge of learning audience values. I argue that for scientific experts to be epistemically trustworthy, they should adopt a cooperative approach to learning about the values of their audience. A cooperative approach, in which expert and nonexpert inquirers iteratively refine value judgments, better achieves important second-order epistemic dimensions of trustworthiness. I suggest that strong objectivity in the feminist standpoint theoretic sense is sometimes a prerequisite for trustworthiness.
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