No Such Thing as Too Many Minds.

Many philosophical views have the surprising implication that, within the boundaries of each human being, there is not just one mind, but many: anywhere from two (the person and their brain, or the person and their body) to trillions (each of the nearly-entirely-overlapping precise entities generate...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 102; no. 1; pp. 131 - 147
Autor principal: Roelofs, Luke
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Mar2024
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:Many philosophical views have the surprising implication that, within the boundaries of each human being, there is not just one mind, but many: anywhere from two (the person and their brain, or the person and their body) to trillions (each of the nearly-entirely-overlapping precise entities generated by the Problem of the Many). This is often treated as absurd, a problem of 'Too Many Minds', which we must find ways to avoid. It is often thought specifically absurd to allow such a multiplication of conscious subjects, even if we could accept it for physical objects. I consider metaphysical, phenomenological, and moral arguments for this asymmetry, and show that they all fail: many overlapping conscious minds is no more problematic than many overlapping physical objects. Theories that imply such a multiplicity may or may not be true, but they cannot be rejected simply for implying it.