No Such Thing as Too Many Minds.
Many philosophical views have the surprising implication that, within the boundaries of each human being, there is not just one mind, but many: anywhere from two (the person and their brain, or the person and their body) to trillions (each of the nearly-entirely-overlapping precise entities generate...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 102; no. 1; pp. 131 - 147 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=176495379&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 176495379 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2024 vid: 102 iid: 1 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 176495379 10.1080/00048402.2022.2084758 ppf: 131 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: No Such Thing as Too Many Minds. aug: au: Roelofs, Luke affil: New York University su: Philosophical research Multiplication Consciousness Metaphysics Phenomenology sug: subj: Philosophical research Multiplication Consciousness Metaphysics Phenomenology keyword: Manyism Mereology Overlap Parthood Problem of the Many ab: Many philosophical views have the surprising implication that, within the boundaries of each human being, there is not just one mind, but many: anywhere from two (the person and their brain, or the person and their body) to trillions (each of the nearly-entirely-overlapping precise entities generated by the Problem of the Many). This is often treated as absurd, a problem of 'Too Many Minds', which we must find ways to avoid. It is often thought specifically absurd to allow such a multiplication of conscious subjects, even if we could accept it for physical objects. I consider metaphysical, phenomenological, and moral arguments for this asymmetry, and show that they all fail: many overlapping conscious minds is no more problematic than many overlapping physical objects. Theories that imply such a multiplicity may or may not be true, but they cannot be rejected simply for implying it. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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