Hypothetical Frequencies as Approximations.
Hájek (Erkenntnis 70(2):211–235, 2009) argues that probabilities cannot be the limits of relative frequencies in counterfactual infinite sequences. I argue for a different understanding of these limits, drawing on Norton's (Philos Sci 79(2):207–232, 2012) distinction between approximations (inexact...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 4; pp. 1295 - 1326 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2024
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Hájek (Erkenntnis 70(2):211–235, 2009) argues that probabilities cannot be the limits of relative frequencies in counterfactual infinite sequences. I argue for a different understanding of these limits, drawing on Norton's (Philos Sci 79(2):207–232, 2012) distinction between approximations (inexact descriptions of a target) and idealizations (separate models that bear analogies to the target). Then, I adapt Hájek's arguments to this new context. These arguments provide excellent reasons not to use hypothetical frequencies as idealizations, but no reason not to use them as approximations. |
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