Hypothetical Frequencies as Approximations.

Hájek (Erkenntnis 70(2):211–235, 2009) argues that probabilities cannot be the limits of relative frequencies in counterfactual infinite sequences. I argue for a different understanding of these limits, drawing on Norton's (Philos Sci 79(2):207–232, 2012) distinction between approximations (inexact...

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Published in:Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 4; pp. 1295 - 1326
Main Author: Steeger, Jer
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Apr2024
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Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        au: Steeger, Jer
        affil: https://ror.org/00cvxb145 Department of Philosophy, University of Washington, Savery Hall, Room 361, 98195, Seattle, WA, USA
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        Probability theory
        Counterfactuals (Logic)
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          Argument
          Probability theory
          Counterfactuals (Logic)
          Analogy
      ab: Hájek (Erkenntnis 70(2):211–235, 2009) argues that probabilities cannot be the limits of relative frequencies in counterfactual infinite sequences. I argue for a different understanding of these limits, drawing on Norton's (Philos Sci 79(2):207–232, 2012) distinction between approximations (inexact descriptions of a target) and idealizations (separate models that bear analogies to the target). Then, I adapt Hájek's arguments to this new context. These arguments provide excellent reasons not to use hypothetical frequencies as idealizations, but no reason not to use them as approximations.
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