A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values.

We begin by showing that every theory of the value of uncertain prospects must have one of three unpalatable properties. Reckless theories recommend giving up a sure thing, no matter how good, for an arbitrarily tiny chance of enormous gain; timid theories permit passing up an arbitrarily large pote...

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Published in:Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 58; no. 2; pp. 431 - 456
Main Authors: Beckstead, Nick, Thomas, Teruji
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Jun2024
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values.
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          Beckstead, Nick
          Thomas, Teruji
        affil:
          Independent Researcher
          Global Priorities Institute, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford
      su:
        Decision theory
        Probability theory
        Cost
      sug:
        subj:
          Decision theory
          Probability theory
          Cost
      ab: We begin by showing that every theory of the value of uncertain prospects must have one of three unpalatable properties. Reckless theories recommend giving up a sure thing, no matter how good, for an arbitrarily tiny chance of enormous gain; timid theories permit passing up an arbitrarily large potential gain to prevent a tiny increase in risk; non‐transitive theories deny the principle that, if A$A$ is better than B$B$ and B$B$ is better than C$C$, then A$A$ must be better than C$C$. Having set up this trilemma, we study its horns. Non‐transitivity has been much discussed; we focus on drawing out the costs and benefits of recklessness and timidity when it comes to axiology, decision theory, and normative uncertainty.
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    language: English
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