No Point of View Except Ours?
I argue that it's quite comprehensible to get upset about metaethical nihilism, to indulge what I call nihilistic despair. When we lose the objective moral or normative point of view, we lose the promise of luck-immune guidance and categorical importance, things many of us hope for. This is all quit...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 43; no. 2; pp. 479 - 490 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I argue that it's quite comprehensible to get upset about metaethical nihilism, to indulge what I call nihilistic despair. When we lose the objective moral or normative point of view, we lose the promise of luck-immune guidance and categorical importance, things many of us hope for. This is all quite Williams-friendly, but I reject his puzzling but suggestive remarks that nihilistic despair must be a self-pitying muddle. Finally, I argue that internalism about reasons is even more depressing than outright nihilism, in one way at least. |
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