No Point of View Except Ours?

I argue that it's quite comprehensible to get upset about metaethical nihilism, to indulge what I call nihilistic despair. When we lose the objective moral or normative point of view, we lose the promise of luck-immune guidance and categorical importance, things many of us hope for. This is all quit...

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Publicado en:Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 43; no. 2; pp. 479 - 490
Autor principal: Elson, Luke
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature May2024
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: No Point of View Except Ours?
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        au: Elson, Luke
        affil: https://ror.org/05v62cm79 Department of Philosophy, University of Reading, Reading, UK
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        Internalism (Theory of knowledge)
        Normativity (Ethics)
        Nihilism
        Despair
        Metaethics
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          Internalism (Theory of knowledge)
          Normativity (Ethics)
          Nihilism
          Despair
          Metaethics
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        Absolute importance
        Moral point of view
        Williams
      ab: I argue that it's quite comprehensible to get upset about metaethical nihilism, to indulge what I call nihilistic despair. When we lose the objective moral or normative point of view, we lose the promise of luck-immune guidance and categorical importance, things many of us hope for. This is all quite Williams-friendly, but I reject his puzzling but suggestive remarks that nihilistic despair must be a self-pitying muddle. Finally, I argue that internalism about reasons is even more depressing than outright nihilism, in one way at least.
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