Replies to Howell, Jackson, Kind, and Montero.

The article offers information on the knowledge argument's second main step, which infers a physical-phenomenal modal gap from a corresponding epistemic gap. Topics include Robert J. Howell's resistance to this inference through his acquaintance strategy, the application of David J. Chalmers' master...

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Publicado en:Philosophia Vol. 52; no. 2; pp. 245 - 256
Autor principal: Alter, Torin
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2024
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Replies to Howell, Jackson, Kind, and Montero.
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        au: Alter, Torin
        affil: https://ror.org/03xrrjk67 The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL, USA
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        Howell, Robert J.
        Chalmers, David J.
        Epistemics
        Theory of knowledge
        Language & logic
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          Howell, Robert J.
          Chalmers, David J.
          Epistemics
          Theory of knowledge
          Language & logic
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        Acquaintance
        Monism
        Physicalism
        Representationalism
        Supervenience
        The knowledge argument
      ab: The article offers information on the knowledge argument's second main step, which infers a physical-phenomenal modal gap from a corresponding epistemic gap. Topics include Robert J. Howell's resistance to this inference through his acquaintance strategy, the application of David J. Chalmers' master argument involving transparent explanation, and the physical-phenomenal epistemic gap's implications for explaining phenomenal truths.
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    language: English
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