Replies to Howell, Jackson, Kind, and Montero.
The article offers information on the knowledge argument's second main step, which infers a physical-phenomenal modal gap from a corresponding epistemic gap. Topics include Robert J. Howell's resistance to this inference through his acquaintance strategy, the application of David J. Chalmers' master...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 52; no. 2; pp. 245 - 256 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The article offers information on the knowledge argument's second main step, which infers a physical-phenomenal modal gap from a corresponding epistemic gap. Topics include Robert J. Howell's resistance to this inference through his acquaintance strategy, the application of David J. Chalmers' master argument involving transparent explanation, and the physical-phenomenal epistemic gap's implications for explaining phenomenal truths. |
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