What if We Seem to Seem and Not Seem? Estimating the Unreasonable Price of Illusionism.

With its strategic consideration of phenomenal consciousness illusorily seeming to us, illusionism claims to deny phenomenality and thereby obviate the hard problem of consciousness. The problem with illusionism, however, is that, although its thesis appears persuasively simple, it strikes as absurd...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Problems / Problemos Vol. 105; pp. 180 - 196
Autor principal: Karak, Biplab
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Vilnius University 2024
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=177976287&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 177976287
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        13921126
        3D4C
      jtl: Problems / Problemos
      issn: 13921126
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: 2024
      vid: 105
      pid: 16037
      pub: Vilnius University
    artinfo:
      ui:
        177976287
        10.15388/Problemos.2024.105.14
      ppf: 180
      ppct: 16
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 10.9MB
      tig:
        atl: What if We Seem to Seem and Not Seem? Estimating the Unreasonable Price of Illusionism.
      aug:
        au: Karak, Biplab
        affil: School of Liberal Arts, Indian Institute of Technology, India
      su:
        Prices
        Consciousness
        Realism
      sug:
        subj:
          Prices
          Consciousness
          Realism
      keyword:
        illusion
        illusionism
        phenomenal consciousness
        phenomenal realism
        phenomenality
        fenomenali sąmonė
        fenomenalumas
        fenomenalus realizmas
        iliuzija
        iliuzionizmas
      ab:
        With its strategic consideration of phenomenal consciousness illusorily seeming to us, illusionism claims to deny phenomenality and thereby obviate the hard problem of consciousness. The problem with illusionism, however, is that, although its thesis appears persuasively simple, it strikes as absurd insofar as the phenomenal illusions themselves also seem as much as phenomenality, keeping no fundamental differences between the two. In short, it reinforces the same phenomenon/issue, i.e., phenomenality, that it claims to deny/avoid. This single absurdity is reflective of its self-refuting nature, and it alone is enough for a rejection of illusionism. However, does illusionism have any reasonable justification to defend itself in the face of the experientially undeniable reality of phenomenal consciousness? This paper attempts to find out if there is any such illusionist justification.
        Pasitelkęs savo strateginę nuostatą, kad mūsų fenomenaliai sąmonei regisi iliuziškai, iliuzionizmas siekia paneigti fenomenalumą ir tokiu būdu išvengti sudėtingos sąmonės problemos. Tačiau iškyla su iliuzionizmu susijusi problema: nors jo tezė ir skamba įtikinamai paprastai, tačiau jis netikėtai pasirodo esąs tiek pat absurdiškas kaip ir fenomenaliosios iliuzijos, kurios atrodo esančios tokios pat, kaip ir fenomenalumas. Taip nebelieka esminių skirtumų tarp šių dviejų kategorijų. Trumpai tariant, iliuzionizmas sustiprina tą patį reiškinį / problemą, tai yra fenomenalumą, kurį sakėsi galįs paneigti ar jo išvengti. Šis išskirtinis absurdas atsispindi save paneigiančioje iliuzionizmo prigimtyje. Vien jo pakanka iliuzionizmui atmesti. Tačiau ar iliuzionizmas turi kokį nors protu pagrįstą savęs pateisinimą, kad galėtų apsiginti susidūręs su patiriamai nepaneigiama fenomenalios sąmonės realybe? Šiuo straipsniu siekiama nustatyti, ar iliuzionizmas turi kokį nors tokio pobūdžio savęs pateisinimą.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Problems / Problemos
      holder: Vilnius University
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2024
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N